Jaana Eigi' PhD thesis defense

On August 17th at 14:15 Jaana Eigi will defend her PhD thesis in philosophy titled "The Social Organization of Science as a Question for Philosophy of Science". The defense will take place at the UT Senate Hall.

Jaana Eigi's supervisor is Associate Professor Endla Lõhkivi and her opponent is University researcher Kristina Rolin, University of Helsinki, Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies (Finland).

Abstract of the thesis:
Philosophy of science has shown increasing interest in the social aspects and the social organisation of science—the ways social values and social interactions and structures play a role in the creation of knowledge and the ways their role should be taken into account in the organisation of science and science policy. My thesis explores a number of issues related to this theme. I argue that a prominent approach to the social organisation of science—Philip Kitcher’s well-ordered science—runs into a number of problems. They undermine its philosophical plausibility and practical usefulness. I agree with Kitcher that arguments about the social organisation of science should recognise profound consequences science has for society. Kitcher argues that the appropriate organisation of science should therefore take into account laypersons’ values and needs when making decisions about the research planning and the acceptance and application of its results. My criticisms show that this is not enough.

Drawing on Helen Longino ideas, I argue that laypersons’ perspectives and knowledge may also be relevant when doing research. In order to show how more inclusive research practices may be possible, I discuss connections between philosophy of science and some developments in science policy. Recent science policy has also shown considerable interest in democratisation. I show that sometimes these public participation experiments may be close enough to what the philosopher would recommend. Their analysis can thus be helpful for understanding how social and political contexts may provide opportunities for the involvement of laypersons in science and what factors may endanger its success. I conclude that one way to pursue a more socially relevant philosophy of science is to focus on the points of contact and possibilities of cooperation between philosophical proposals and these public participation initiatives.