Doctoral defence: Juho Kaarlo Sakari Lindholm „Knowledge and Practice. A Criticism of the Concept of Knowledge“

On 28 November at 12:15 Juho Kaarlo Sakari Lindholm will defend his doctoral thesis “„Knowledge and Practice. A Criticism of the Concept of Knowledge” („Teadmine ja praktika. Teadmise mõiste kriitika”) for obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Philosophy).

Supervisor: 
Research Fellow Ave Mets, University of Tartu

Opponent: 
Professor Sami Johannes Pihlström, University of Helsinki (Finland)

Summary
Knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified true belief. This definition usually goes unquestioned. The traditional definition leaves it problematic, how knowledge can be intelligibly ascribed to a person: it seems that one can have a belief without manifesting it, and it also seems that one can manifest a belief without having it. Thus, it is difficult to determine whether anybody knows anything.

Moreover, mainstream epistemologists subscribe to a narrow, impoverished notion of experience that only encompasses observation. Action and the establishment of habit are ignored without justification. The traditional definition of knowledge ignores them too. Thus, mainstream analytic epistemology is unable to capture the importance of experimental practice.

I argue that knowledge is practice. That solves the two problems mentioned above. First, practice is manifest in performance, which makes it possible to intelligibly ascribe knowledge to the agent. Second, experimentation is one practice among others. That relinquishes the overly intellectual notion of knowledge. I draw from classical pragmatism.

Following John Dewey and Karen Barad I define experience as organism—environment intra-action. By definition, experience is bidirectional and both “subjective” and “objective” at once. It encompasses observation, action, and the establishment of habit. Experience takes place within an integral situation, and each situation is at least potentially different from others. Therefore, all experience is fallible and hence also experimental. Experience presents problems to be solved, and the construction of a solution is up to us. All experience is epistemically problematic. Therefore, experience must be considered as data, or signs of something else that it might represent.

An analysis of signs shows that performance is a sign of knowledge. That justifies a (fallible) inference from performance to knowledge. But then knowledge must be considered as practice.

The decence will be held also in Zoom (meeting ID: 988 3579 3068, passcode: 980661).