Doctoral defence: Nikolai Shurakov „Experimental Contribution to Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy“

Doctoral diplomas
Author: Andres Tennus

On 27 October at 14:15 Nikolai Shurakov will defend his doctoral thesis "Experimental Contribution to Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy" for obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Philosophy).

Supervisors:
Associate Professor Alexander Stewart Davies, University of Tartu
Researcher Alexander Wiegmann, Universidad de Granada (Spain)

Opponent:
Professor Vilius Dranseika, Uniwersytet Jagielloński (Poland)

Summary

In the mid-20th century, ordinary language philosophers such as J. L. Austin and G. Ryle relied mainly on their own linguistic intuitions when analysing how people use everyday language. They tried to describe how ordinary expressions are used. This approach was criticised, as claims about language use often require verification. Since the early 2000s, experimental philosophy has emerged as a natural ally to ordinary language philosophy: equipped with a range of transparent and replicable experimental tools, philosophers can now verify their intuitions empirically and overcome this critique. The dissertation contributes to the intersection of contemporary ordinary language philosophy and experimental philosophy through four articles.

The first article shows that our attributions of knowledge (for instance, claims like “I know that the bank is open tomorrow”) are stake-sensitive – our judgments depend on how much is at stake and shift according to the importance of the situation. The second article argues that such stake-sensitivity does not apply to the folk concept of lying: we tend to classify a statement as a lie regardless of how serious the consequences may be. The third article explores the concepts of lying and falsity internalised by GPT-4 and compares them with those of humans. The results reveal a strong overall alignment – in many cases, GPT and humans make similar judgments – but also show systematic differences. The fourth article studies an Estonian pejorative that combines traits of slurs and non-slur pejoratives. It finds that although some historical uses could have served laudable functions, the term still risks four harms that derive precisely from its hybrid status.

The dissertation not only showcases how contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be pursued through a variety of methods, but also demonstrates that many philosophical debates can benefit from it. These debates range from questions about the nature of knowledge to issues concerning AI, so the prospects of contemporary ordinary language philosophy are bright.

The defence can be followed on Zoom (meeting ID: 912 8480 2374, passcode: 620558).